NEW STATESMAN On narcissim: the mirror and the self
On narcissism: the mirror and the self
People from Tiger Woods to the Obamas are routinely denounced for their narcissism. But what does the word really mean and are there good as well as bad types of self-love?
By Rachel Cusk Published 03 August 2013 11:35
A rounded image: but modern culture is solipsistic,
fixed on looking inward at our own preoccupations. Photo: Fleur van Dodewaard,
part of the Sun Set Series (2011)
Sylvia Plath said that writers are the most narcissistic people: whatever
the truth of that statement, one can assume at least that her use of the term
was correct. Freud bequeathed the modern era a tangled concept in narcissism,
and literary culture has shown itself as apt as any other to misappropriate it.
Yet it is the fashion to see people increasingly as one of two types a
narcissist, or the victim of one so perhaps it is worth asking precisely what
is meant by the word, which has come to encapsulate a cultural malaise.
Alongside the struggle in the modern era to define and enshrine narcissism
as a psychiatric condition, the term has been appropriated as a shorthand for
the general idea of self-obsession. This is a diverse concept with a large
vocabulary of its own, but that vocabulary is increasingly abandoned in favour
of a word whose ill-defined connotations of mental illness give it a strange
force. What we think narcissism is, and how much of what we see seems to answer
to it, depends in reality on the moral status we accord the self: the very
forcefulness of narcissism lies in the fact that it illuminates the person
saying it as much as the person against whom it is said. And indeed narcissism,
classically, is a business of echo and reflection that can give rise to a
narrative of maddening circularity, of repetition and counter-repetition, in
which self and other struggle to separate and define themselves.

Surface intention: Obama allows himself to be used as a
channel for reflecting on the American story.
Photo: Pete Souza/The White House/Polaris/eyevine
Photo: Pete Souza/The White House/Polaris/eyevine
Narcissism describes a culturally induced kind of subjectivity, writes
the psychoanalyst Sergio Benvenuto, a new way in which modern subjects
secularise ideals, sex objects and knowledge, a culture in which people believe
less and less in psychoanalysis. A narcissistic culture, in other words, will
pillory what it calls narcissists and disown certain cultural products as
narcissistic in order to avoid self-revelation and obstruct the pursuit of
personal truth.
In US politics, where narcissism has come to signify the very elision of
power and personality that has been fundamental to the nations ascendant
culture of self, the effect is of a hall of mirrors: The authors blame John
Edwardss narcissism for his downfall and describe Bill Clinton as a narcissist
on an epic scale, a book reviewer recently wrote in the New York Times. Do a
Google search on Tiger Woods and narcissist and you get tens of thousands of
references . . . Rush Limbaugh calls President Obama a narcissist, it seems,
every 24 hours. Mitt Romney, himself a known narcissist, also favours this
analysis of Obama, and avidly posts evidence for it on his website. The book
Malignant Self-Love: Narcissism Revisited by Sam Vaknin is often cited
in support of these diagnoses. Unfortunately it appears that Mr Vaknin, too, is
a narcissist.
Narcissism, in the case of Obama and other political leaders, is a
catch-all term for nearly every quality a person might require in order to
become, for instance, president of the United States: ambition, determination,
vision, self-belief. But Obama, in the eyes of his critics, also qualifies as
another kind of narcissist. Perhaps not surprisingly for a man whose principal
accomplishment before becoming president was to write two autobiographies,
writes one journalist, Obama has seemed to spend an inordinate amount of time
talking about himself. And its not just Obama, but the first lady, too.
Michelle Obamas narcissism is illustrated thus, in a long quotation from a
talk she gave to students at the University of Mumbai:
I didnt grow up with a lot of money. I mean, my parents
I had two parents. I was lucky to have two parents, and they always had a job,
but we didnt have a lot of money. But it was because of working hard, and
studying, and learning how to write and read. And then I got a chance to go to
college. And then college opened up the world to me. I started seeing all these
things that I could be or do and I never even imagined being the first lady of
the United States. But because I had an education, when the time came to do
this, I was ready. So just remember there is nothing that you guys cant do. You
know, you have everything it takes to be successful and smart and to raise a
family, right? What do you say?
The writer continues: The poor students in Mumbai might have had something
to say, but the first lady never let them say a word. Instead, she continued on
with her monologue before permitting a question. She then answered that question
by referring to her favourite subject: herself and Barack Obama.
This second narcissist, who spends all his time talking about himself, is
in a way a more complex figure, and one that is harder to isolate, particularly
in a culture (America) where fame and autobiography are so intertwined. As in
Michelle Obamas telling of it, fame (or power, or success) is the happy ending
in the American story of life; that story is usually a narrative of ascent.
Generally speaking, the Obamas have been lauded for talking about themselves
they have demonstrated an impeccable grasp of autobiographical form. They have
in many ways revived and reshaped it by salting the ascent with just enough
reality (or honesty) to make the American story seem true again. Its a
delicate illusion to manage, and one that is threatened by the notion that the
autobiographer isnt advancing the common story of life after all but is simply
talking about his favourite subject, himself.
George J Marlin, the author of Narcissist Nation: Reflections of a
Blue-State Conservative (reflections seems to be an unintended pun),
claims that Obama uses the I word more than all the presidents have used it
collectively in the 200-and-some-odd years of our nation. The conservative, it
seems, more readily than the democrat, sees autobiography as a form of bad
manners (the I word); and indeed, one reading of the myth of Narcissus
itself is as a story of unmannerliness and its consequences.
Christopher Lasch, in his celebrated book The Culture of Narcissism:
American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations (1979), wrote: The new
narcissist is haunted not by guilt but by anxiety. He seeks not to inflict his
own certainties on others but to find a meaning in life. The guilt of the old
narcissist might constitute nothing more than this conservative aversion to
self-disclosure. The old narcissist processed his self-obsession by inflicting
his certainties in a way that nonetheless left his self concealed: the new
narcissist, by contrast, presents an agonised face to the world; his self is
confessed and given over to others, leaving him free to ignore the social
contract and do as he likes.
Malignant Self-Love is written in the survivor mode of American
letters, the author having survived both his own confessed narcissism and that
of his parents and gone on to found Narcissus Publications, an outlet for his
own works. Yet Vaknins definition of narcissism is accurate enough: the
narcissistic personality is rigid to the point of being unable to change in
reaction to changing circumstances . . . Such a person takes behavioural,
emotional and cognitive cues exclusively from others. His inner world is, so to
speak, vacated. His True Self is dilapidated and dysfunctional. Instead he has a
tyrannical and delusional False Self. Such a person is incapable of loving and
of living. He cannot love others because he cannot love himself. He loves his
reflection, his surrogate self. And he is incapable of living because life is a
struggle towards, a striving, a drive at something. In other words: life is
change. He who cannot change cannot live. The narcissist is an actor in a
monodrama, yet forced to remain behind the scenes. The scenes take centre stage,
instead. The narcissist does not cater at all to his own needs. Contrary to his
reputation, the narcissist does not love himself in any true sense of the
word.
What is compelling here is the notion that the narcissists inner world
is, so to speak, vacated. D W Winnicotts interjection of the maternal figure
into the theory of primary narcissism attributes that vacated inner world to an
initial absence of recognition: The mother gazes at the baby in her arms, and
the baby gazes at his mothers face and finds himself therein . . . provided
that the mother is really looking at the unique, small, helpless being and not
projecting her own expectations, fears and plans for the child. In that case,
the child would find not himself in his mothers face, but rather the mothers
own projections. This child would remain without a mirror, and for the rest of
his life would be seeking this mirror in vain.
The widespread notion of a healthy degree of narcissism, according to
this definition, is not quite the essential dose of vanity or self-regard were
so often told to allow ourselves; perhaps, rather, there is an extent to which a
person needs to be another persons projection, their construction, an inner
space that is and ought to remain vacated in order for the social dynamic to
function.
Liberated from the superstitions of the past, Christopher Lasch
continues, the new narcissist doubts even the reality of his own existence.
Superficially relaxed and tolerant . . . his sexual attitudes are permissive
rather than puritanical, even though his emancipation from ancient taboos brings
him no sexual peace. Fiercely competitive in his demand for approval and
acclaim, he distrusts competition because he associates it unconsciously with an
unbridled urge to destroy. He extols co-operation and teamwork while harbouring
deeply antisocial impulses. He praises respect for rules and regulations in the
secret belief that they do not apply to himself. Acquisitive in the sense that
his cravings have no limits, he does not accumulate goods and provisions against
the future, but demands immediate gratification and lives in a state of
restless, perpetually unsatisfied desire.
Laschs new narcissist isnt so new any longer: he has become a parent.
It might be said that social media such as Twitter and Facebook those shrines
to the self are among the new narcissists offspring, and they are often
seized on as evidence of our own culture of narcissism. The notion of
networking as a façade for antisocial impulses is compelling, but in fact the
most striking thing about the representation of self in these forums is its
triviality. This may be one consequence of parental over-approval, the
outpourings of a generation whose parents abstained from criticising them and
instead hung on their every word and deed. The belief that you are very
important, in other words, could be genuine of course the world wants to know
what you had for lunch.
Talking about your favourite subject, in this context, is not just
permissible but mandatory: displaying the culturally approved degree of
self-love is a sign of narcissistic health. In its healthy guise, narcissism
bears no relation to Vaknins vacated inner space, for the defining
characteristic of contemporary healthy narcissism is banality. The
psychoanalytic literature concurs in finding mental activity in itself to be
narcissistic: thinking is an act of libidinal appropriation, in which the self
removes its attention from the object. The I word, in fact, is as dirty as it
ever was, when caught in the act of pursuing its own truth. Instead, the duty of
the contemporary I is to confess itself in public, to dismiss itself by
surrendering to an agreed social narrative as rigid in its permissiveness as it
once was in its conservatism. According to that narrative, if youre not your
own favourite subject, there is something wrong with you. Health requires
it, and thinking is unhealthy. Hence what looks like a series of consequences
that in a culture of relentless disclosure we have become obsessed with rights
of privacy is in fact a set of concurrently held and contradictory beliefs.
Self-disclosure is one thing; selfexamination quite another.
When Tracey Emins Everyone I Have Ever Slept With 1963-1995 went
up in smoke in the 2004 Momart warehouse fire, there was unseemly jubilation in
the right-wing press: Traceys tent represented the cardinal sin of
confessional art. Emin is an artist who is often called narcissistic, and
there are many ways in which she and more specifically, the tent illustrates
the contemporary misappropriation of the term. The problem with confessional
art, in the eyes of its critics, is that it conflates the trivial and the
serious; the more the self is trivialised, the more abhorrent to culture this
conflation will seem. In other words, the tent was shocking not because it
disclosed what was private and personal, but because it was called art. More
than that, its disclosures were not healthy. And finally, the tent was not
tragic. This was very annoying, and made its incineration seem like a piece of
poetic justice. Had the tent been self-loathing, it might have fitted in to the
narrative of ascent: a girl regrets her chequered past and goes on to become a
famous artist, selling her work for vast sums. But like Louise Bourgeois, Emin
reprised feminine skills of needlework in order to represent a subjection in
which self-discipline and self-care survived; a female art signifying not
tragedy, but dignity. The tent is a piece of storytelling it is commemorative,
for keeping. A confession, on the other hand, is something to be thrown away
in the hope of absolution. The confessional work, strictly speaking, is an
admission of abnormality made out of the desire to become normal.
Emin has had great play in and on the contemporary obsession with
narcissism, outwitting it at every turn. Her exertions demonstrate how hard it
has become to serve the autobiographical impulse and raise the question of why
the I word is such a locus of contradiction. Paradoxically, in a climate of
unfettered disclosure, the artist is abhorred for examining herself.
Recently I participated in a literary event at which a number of memoirists
read from their work. It was striking how many of them assured the audience that
this is not about me. It seemed that the only legitimate excuse for writing
autobiography was to present it as a kind of war report I was there, I
witnessed it, but this is not about me. And there was nothing shamefaced about
it: what these writers were saying, in fact, was that their work was serious,
that although it looked like autobiography (triviality) it was actually diligent
documentary (art). Tracey Emins statement is the reverse: This is all about
me. What Emin has understood, as the Obamas have understood, is the notion of
autobiographical occasion, whereby the self is not merely declarative but
representative; is, in other words, the best example of what it is trying to
say.
There are places in the social narrative where the form has to become
autobiographical in order to advance itself; history passes to the individual
for a while, as when a black man becomes president of the United States of
America, or a working-class woman becomes one of the most powerful artists of
her era. The story of how this came to be is not the story of one exceptional
person: rather, that person is able to express and illustrate change through
their own being. Self-portraiture was the best way for Rembrandt to describe the
ascent of the self and the new relationship with worldliness and death it
betokened. At the other end of history, Emins tent documents not just the
changed status of the female body, but the contemporary problem of the
personal itself, a representation she has pushed to the limit by making it
co-extensive with Tracey Emin.
To return to Sylvia Plath . . . Literary culture has a far less comfortable
relationship with self-analysis and self-portraiture than the visual arts, which
is the mark of its conservatism. The openly self-analysing writer will be
pilloried for talking about his or her favourite subject, for bad manners in
using the I word. The literary reverence for the idea of imagination, as
well as for history and for tales of otherness, is perhaps another iteration
of what Virginia Woolf observed to be the culturally sanctioned important
(male) subjects for the novel. The more other a text, the less it can be
believed to be narcissistic; if the personal is trivial, the impersonal is
important.
Freud described narcissism as a tactic, a libidinal position, as Sergio
Benvenuto puts it, taken, for example, when a human being is in physical pain.
Classical neurotic suffering drags narcissism along, because being neurotic in
Freudian terms means not knowing what one desires. This uncertainty, or puzzling
state of gaping desire, hauls along narcissistic constellations.
A writer may indeed be someone driven by classical neurotic suffering,
but, to quote Benvenuto again, The symptom of narcissism is fascination . . .
for Freud, our narcissistic love for ourselves is never natural, or primary.
Personal truth the self-portrait is in fact the opposite of narcissistic.
Rather, the narcissistic artist is tactically seductive and charming, and
imagination can be one such tactic. Writers may be narcissists, dragging along
evolving literary constructions, but the central preoccupation of the narcissist
is the avoidance of self-exposure while garnering attention and praise.
Whether or not narcissism is misunderstood and misused, its usage is
puritanical: it is intended to inflict shame. Often the so-called narcissists
self-exposure the very thing that makes him vulnerable has already been
rewarded, if only by the attention of his critics; hence their anger. The
accusation becomes an echo chamber, as in Ovids telling of the myth, where
Narcissus and Echo can only say, Who are you? to one another, in a
conversation that can never progress. This reflexive relationship leads both
parties into upset and madness: Echo runs away, and Narcissus, driven by thirst,
goes to the waters wherein his mother was once trapped and seduced, and where he
was conceived. He becomes fixated with this source of self, on whose surface his
own image floats: he doesnt recognise the image and mistakes it for a being
that might reciprocate. Yet he is thrilled at last to feel something, to feel
love. When he tries to approach the image, it disappears. When he retreats, it
comes back again.
Its a pretty concept, and one that does indeed describe the struggle of
creativity. The eventual result of this impasse is transformation. What is human
in Narcissus dies and distils itself: his self-absorption bears fruit and is
bequeathed to the world, becoming a flower that grows at the waters edge, where
he himself began.
Rachel Cusks most recent book is Aftermath: On Marriage and
Separation (Faber & Faber,
£8.99)